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This article explores how decentralization supports the policy commitments made by the
Viet Nam government to increase citizen participation and accountability, and to
reduce poverty and regional disparities. The article includes a review of basic
definitions of decentralization that places the case study in an international context, a
brief look at the unique, historical context in Viet Nam and its relevance, a brief
comparison of policy intention vs implementation reality, a preliminary analysis of the
impact of decentralization during the period, and a concluding section on remaining
challenges. The article examines the interplay between hierarchical and network
organizations in Viet Nam, as stakeholders seek to better define the respective roles and
authority of the party, and other public, quasi-public and private organizations at
different territorial levels.
INTRODUCTION2
The success of East Asia at promoting economic growth and poverty reduction is well
known. Since the early 1980s, sustained real growth of 6 per cent per capita has reduced
poverty rates by half. But not all areas are equally well connected with newly expanding
economies or regions, nor are basic public services accessible by all. As economic
growth progressed, pockets of poverty were often accompanied by growing inequalities,
both across the region and within countries, between urban and rural areas, uplands and
lowlands, and rain-fed and irrigated farming land.
Across Asia Pacific, and most marked in East Asia, one common feature of the
approach of governments keen to foster growth alongside poverty reduction has been to
assign state powers, responsibilities and resources to subnational authorities and to
private and civil society agencies under various forms of contract, partnership or
principal-agent relationship. Decentralization has become the catch-all term for what
proves in practice to be a highly differentiated, and differently motivated, range of
practices and institutional forms. Although many East Asian countries are moving
toward a greater role for local government, the region’s experience defies any single
application of the concept ‘decentralization’. At the same time, although central-local
relations are being reconfigured in many different ways, it is quite clear that sub
national areas are now regarded as important for effective governance. To this scale of
governance is pinned the hopes of better service delivery and private enterprise
promotion, and increasingly the sub national scale is seen as the site for the exercise of
new forms of participation and citizenship emerging throughout the region.
The case of decentralization in Viet Nam fits the regional pattern of policy intention
tempered by eclectic experience. This article will explore how decentralization supports
the policy commitment to increase public access to government affairs; brings about
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greater responsiveness and accountability of locally elected leaders; better matches
resources for public services with locally defined, and often highly specific, needs. At
the impact level, the article will investigate how decentralization is associated,
positively or negatively, with achievement of commitments made by the government to
poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. It will also examine the interplay
between hierarchical and network organizations in Viet Nam, as stakeholders seek to
better define the respective roles and authority of the party, and other public, quasi-
public and private organizations at different territorial levels.
The relationships between political participation, democracy and decentralization have
of course been debated since John Stuart Mill and are still not entirely clear (Breton
1998; Litvack 1998). But the intention here is to identify problems, challenges and
innovative experiences in ways that contribute to building fair societies and
democratized public policies that work for poverty reduction within the framework of
fiscal discipline.
DECENTRALIZATION: SOME DEFINITIONS
Decentralization means transferring fiscal, political and administrative functions from
higher to lower levels of government, and can take on different forms depending on the
degree to which authority is assigned to lower levels. Deconcentration involves central
agencies assigning certain functions to lower level branch offices. Delegation takes
place when authority for defined tasks is transferred from one public agency to another
agency or service provider that is accountable to the former, but not wholly controlled
by it. Devolution takes place when authority for defined tasks is transferred from a
public agency to autonomous, local level units of elected leadership holding corporate
status, granted, for example, under legislation.3 Mark Turner, in a volume dedicated to
decentralization in Asia Pacific, provides a useful framework to understand both the
territorial and functional dimensions of decentralization, as well as its common public
and private sector manifestations – which serves to remind that fiscal decentralization is
merely one manifestation of an ongoing restructuring of state-market relations
throughout the region in the past 30 years (Table 1).
Decentralization is not necessarily a spatial concept requiring reassignment of service
delivery responsibilities from higher to lower orders of administration, though this often
is the case. Cohen and Peterson (1995: 61) emphasize that it is rather the broadening of
institutions producing and providing needed goods and services at efficient cost,
wherever they are located and whether they are public, quasi-public or private. Indeed,
the fact that decentralization often manifests in a plurality of agencies, public and
private, operating at different scales of jurisdiction providing overlapping services gives
rise to debate about the consequences for efficiency, through competition, and
accountability, through unclear, overlapping mandates.
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Table 1: Forms of Decentralization
Basis for delegation





























A related element is that sub-national economies are increasing their linkages with
production networks in other countries, both across borders and further afield. Such
links tend to be market driven, and can help to motivate an increasing role for local
governments in investment promotion and the streamlining of business regulation
(Xiangming Chen, 2003).
It is fallacious to presume decentralization indicates an inexorable policy progression
from ‘more’ to ‘less’ centralized governance structures, but by conventional measures,
decentralization is in its early stages of adoption in East Asia, despite common
commitment in most countries to intensify it and the fact that various ‘decentralizations’
are underway.
Historical context to decentralization in Viet Nam4
Viet Nam’s experience with decentralization since 1991 is part of a broader
transformation process. Governance institutions have been influenced by many external
factors, including 1000 years of Chinese rule ending in the 10th century and a tributary
relationship with China for the next 900 years. A continuing challenge has been the
difficulties of successive governments in ruling a narrow, 1500 km long piece of land,
and warding off both internal and external challenges to this rule. The French colonial
administration, starting in the late 19th century, failed to address the long-standing issue
of concentration of landholdings in the hands of a small elite, and offended many by
dividing the country into three parts. A brief period of Japanese occupation during
World War II was followed by the formation of a provisional government of the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, a nationalist-communist group led by Ho Chi Minh,
and a rival government supported by France and the US, the Associated States of Viet
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Nam. Nine years of struggle between the French and the Democratic Republic of Viet
Nam followed, resulting in the end of French colonial rule in 1954.
The ceasefire agreement established a provisional demarcation line 5 km wide at the
17th parallel, and provided for unified national elections in 1956. However, a provisional
government in the south building on the Associated States of Viet Nam regime was
promised continuing support by the US in 1955 and became the Republic of Viet Nam.
The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam initially tried to address this challenge through
political means, but shifted to escalating armed struggle by the late 1950s. Direct US
military support to the Republic of Viet Nam began in 1961, and escalated until
reaching a peak strength of 525 000 US troops in 1968. Following a successful
communist offensive that year, the US came under intense domestic pressure to reduce
its military support. A peace agreement was signed in 1973; the US withdrew and a
unified, communist-led government took control over all of Viet Nam in 1975.
Viet Nam paid a steep price for victory, including an estimated 1.5 million deaths and
the loss of another one million citizens who fled the country after the war, including
many skilled professionals and technicians. For this and other reasons the unified
government did not initially succeed in achieving its goals for economic development
and poverty reduction.
To address these problems the Fifth National Party Congress held in 1982 sanctioned
privately held small enterprises and the ‘family economy’ for agriculture. The latter
gave greater scope for individual initiative, and began to lead to increased agricultural
production. Building on this a major economic reform process known as the doi moi
renovation was launched in 1986. The importance of the reforms was signaled in 1987
when 12 ministers were dismissed, including the ministers of national defense and
interior, and several ministries were merged or restructured, allowing the government to
effectively pursue macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization and deregulation.
Some political prisoners were released and a larger number of candidates than in the
past were allowed to stand for seats in the National Assembly. In 1990 18 000 officials
were dismissed or charged with corruption. The 1992 constitution recognized
individuals’ ownership rights and legitimized the private sector. These changes took
place in response to severe economic problems, including famine in the north in 1988,
limited foreign trade and major deficit spending by the government with resultant
hyperinflation. From 1987 to 1995 the number of ministries was reduced from 28 to 22.
In 1989 a new local government law reduced the number of provincial administrative
offices from 40–50 per province to 17–22. There were corresponding reductions at the
district and commune levels, with a view to streamlining the government apparatus.
Aid also fell dramatically. Aid from the former Soviet Union alone had been 10 per cent
of GDP (mainly financing heavy infrastructure), but by the late 1980s total aid to Viet
Nam was less than 1 per cent of GDP (Dollar and Pritchett 1998:105–108). Yet the
limited aid received was put to good use, for example, to hold meetings with other
reformers in Southeast Asia to improve understanding on the workings of a market
economy, trade liberalization and foreign investment; consultations between the private
sector and government officials; and rural workshops to discuss how donors could best
help with poverty reduction. The non-Soviet aid also gave greater emphasis to social
welfare related areas.
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The results of the doi moi reforms were impressive. In comparison to the 40 poorest
countries in the world in 1986, Viet Nam had the highest economic growth rate over the
next decade, while maintaining or improving human development performance. GDP
grew at an average annual rate of 8 per cent during the 1990s, with household per capita
consumption growing at 7.2 per cent. Real income rose by 39 per cent in real terms
between 1992 and 1998, while the poverty rate was cut by more than one third during
these six years. These changes meant that Viet Nam was well positioned to benefit from
the windfall market opportunities of the Asian region in the early 1990s, and became
attractive to foreign investors just as the US embargo was lifted in late 1993. These
events led to a major infusion of foreign investment and international donor
commitments, resulting in economic growth of almost 9 per cent per year during 1993-
1997. In addition to capital investment, these international interests brought much
needed management and technical expertise to Vietnamese ventures and public sector
projects (Fforde 2001).
Decentralization in Viet Nam: push and pull in center-local relations
Decentralization reforms have unfolded opportunistically in fits and starts, and not as
part of a structured, reform program as in some developed countries. Woven into this
opportunistic pattern, one finds interplay between hierarchical and network
organizations, as stakeholders seek to better define the respective roles and authority of
the party, and other public, quasi-public and private organizations at different territorial
levels.
A major initial challenge of the Communist Party of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
(CPV) founded in 1930 was to establish a unified force first for independence from
colonial rule, and then for victory in the American War. Yet given the realities of
guerilla warfare, this meant giving considerable discretion to local units, linked broadly
to nationalistic and ideological goals. This pattern was a form of organizational
network, composed of many different groups and leaders linked into networks through
various structural, personal and ideological ties. Such a form of organization has been
described as a segmented, polycentric ideologically integrated network (SPIN) by
Gerlach (1987: 115). The form has similarities to the policy networks described by
Klijn (1997: 28–33), which take a pragmatic approach to advancing an array of public
and private interests of network members. A difference from the normal usage is that
the Viet Nam networks discussed here are dominated by state and party members, and
focus mainly on policy implementation rather than design and approval.
Following reunification in 1975 and despite formal CPV control and the appearance of a
hierarchical, Stalinist structure, this organizational network structure with bottom-up
discretion continued in important respects, such as in the growth of nascent markets. In
the late 1970s for example there was increasing buying and selling of products as
farmers began leaving their cooperatives. State enterprises were permitted to trade
freely starting in 1981.
At first glance this movement toward opening up markets could seem a modern
application of the tradition of local autonomy (There is a Vietnamese saying: “The rule
of the emperor stops at the village gate”). To an extent, people were simply responding
to the rigidities of an economic model that was not working in the best way it could.
This went on without any formal decree or other indication that the Party sanctioned the
‘discretion’ embodied in ‘fence-breaking’ activities.5
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However, on closer inspection, it seems likely that the CPV was allowing its
organizational network structure to help prevent any erosion of its authority as market
forces gained an increasing role in the economy. Thaveeporn (1996) points out that
growing acceptance of market forces was linked to the slogan ‘rule by law’, meaning
that the CPV and the state agreed to be less hostile to ‘outsiders’ such as private
businesspersons and foreigners, thus helping to facilitate the robust, export oriented
growth evident since 1992. In addition part of the doi moi reform policy and
institutional package applied has been to assign state powers, responsibilities and
resources first from the CPV to the government, and then from the central government
to subnational authorities and to private and civil society agencies under various forms
of contract, partnership or principal-agent relationship.
Viet Nam during this period was an authoritarian, unitary state, yet also adopted
elements of a collaborative strategy (cf. Roberts, 2000) using organizational networks
responsive to long-standing traditions of peasant innovation and resistance. The state
carried out this dual role (1) by selectively delegating fiscal, administrative, political
powers [including discretions – the most important powers in Viet Nam]) and (2) by
changing notions of the public vs the private sector.
On the first point, there has not been any consistent trend. During the early 1980s, with
growing provincial councils and committees in some areas (provincial ‘emperors’ were
reported ‘dealing at the borders’, handing out logging concessions, black marketeering,
etc.), decentralization was introduced in the form of greater political autonomy in return
for greater fiscal centralization, whereby the tax links with the center were reinforced.
The market-driven, cross-border impetus for a greater local government role in business
promotion is not unlike processes seen in other border areas in the region, such as along
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia borders with Thailand.
During the 1980s also the relative powers of commune and district vs. the province
shifted greatly, but unevenly; networks of elites and their supporters continuously
reconfigured themselves to gain maximum (often self-serving) benefit from a dynamic
environment. All this took place against well-established traditions of fiscal federalism
and reducing inter-provincial inequalities, although the latter was never the primary
rationale.
On the second point, the shifts in notions of ‘public’ vs ‘private’, one sees increasing
appropriation by ‘local’ powers (party, military and administrative) by private means of
what was formerly considered the ‘public’ realm. Again, this is a pattern seen in other
countries (Cf. Table 1, last row). For example health services are increasingly delivered
by a public ‘shell’ filled by‘private service providers’. Much of state-owned enterprise
(SOE) reform has also proceeded as a result of internal equitization (privatization),
whereby the regime allows incumbent managers to take stakes in the new ownership
structure. This provided new ways of winning over party elites and networks for
reforms under the umbrella of party unity.6
These evolving patterns help to explain the nature of Viet Nam's local administration
system today. On a formal level the system is divided geographically into three levels:
provinces (about 60 units including three municipalities), districts (about 600 units) and
communes (about 10,400 units). At all three levels there is a representative body (the
people's council) and an executive body (the people's committee). The people's
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committees and people’s councils often have overlapping membership. The local people
elect the people's council, the candidates for which are usually nominated by the Viet
Nam Fatherland Front7 and approved by the higher-level administrative unit. The
people's council selects the chairman and vice-chairman of the people's committee.
While ultimate legislative authority rests with the National Assembly, provincial and
local departments have a dual reporting responsibility to the local people’s committee
and assembly, and to the central line ministries. Responsibility for planning,
implementation and operation of facilities is split, although the implications of this vary
from province to province, depending on the importance of the province. Large urban
centers under central administration and a good number of provincial governments
enjoy a high degree of autonomy. For example they are authorized to license foreign
investments up to a certain value, approve certain local socioeconomic development
plans and formulate their own budgets.
The local administration, the people's committee, has budgetary and administrative
responsibilities. They are charged with maintaining law, order and security within their
jurisdictions; forwarding budget requests to higher levels; reviewing and approving
plans for socioeconomic development within their delegated authority; executing the
budget; and undertaking duties as assigned by higher levels of administrations.
Local authorities can only carry out administrative functions that are assigned by
national legislation. In accordance with the provisions made in the 1992 constitution, a
number of laws provide the basic framework for local government organization. The
Budget Law that was passed in 1996 then formalized the fiscal arrangements between
different levels of government, assigning important budget responsibilities to local
authorities, especially at the provincial level. As a result, the people's committee has
now both budgetary and administrative responsibilities.
Under the 1992 constitution the popularly elected people's council is ‘the local organ of
the State power’. But in practice there are some obstacles to the council carrying out
this function. While the tasks of people's councils are increasing both in terms of
importance and volume of work, they often have inadequate resources, skills and
infrastructure. Meeting only twice a year, often after the National Assembly's semi-
annual sessions, their contribution to policy discussions at the national level is limited.
Prior to 1992 the main decision-making bodies were not government agencies, but those
of the party. For example a branch of the CPV Central Committee managed government
personnel matters. At the local level, local party committees and mass organizations
were the major players in implementing government and party policies. People’s
councils and people’s committees could not make decisions independent of party
committees. At the commune level the two key decision makers were the secretary of
the commune party committee and the chairman of the cooperative. The 1992
constitution sets out functions that are the responsibility of the National Assembly, the
judiciary and government. Although the party continues to guide policymaking and
continues to maintain party organizations within government agencies, many functions
once carried out by party organizations are now carried out by the government. For
example the Government Committee on Personnel8 (GCOP) was set up in 1994 to
manage government personnel and organization, including issues of the merger or
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abolition of agencies, and the distribution of accountability among provincial, district
and commune levels.
Although there was less real transfer happening from rule by party to rule by
government than appeared from policy statements, there was still some movement from
collective to individual leadership. Authority relations became more based on rule by
law and less on rule by decree. Not surprisingly many practical problems emerged in
implementing the new distribution of tasks under the new constitution and the 1992
Law on the Organization of the Government. There were cases where there was no clear
division of tasks between the prime minister and other ministers. For some matters the
result was the prime minister taking over tasks from his deputies and ministers.
As part of this shift local government agencies also became more important. Previously
local party committees and mass organizations played the dominant role in mobilizing
local people to implement policies. People’s councils and people’s committees did not
have decision making and executive power independent of party committees. The 1989
law on local administration was the first attempt to clarify the roles of different local
government units. However it did not make clear whether people’s council’s were state
agencies or local representative bodies, and whether people’s committees were agents to
implement the decisions of people’s councils, or to implement decisions of higher levels
of the state. The result was that local specialist units responsible for education, health,
and other services were supervised at various times by both, thus creating confusion and
blurring accountability (Thaveeporn 2002).
This notion of accountability has been called ‘double subordination’, or reporting to
different and sometimes inconsistent authorities:
1. Under the 1994 revised law on local administration, people's councils at all
levels are supervised and guided both by the Standing Committee of the
National Assembly and the government;
2. People's committees are held accountable to both the people's council at the
same level as well as to the next highest executive body (either a people's
committee or the government);
3. Some central ministries have branch offices at the local level, which are
administratively placed under the people's committees but which functionally
report directly to their higher authorities, leading to some ambiguity regarding
the accountability of officials.
Although various laws and decisions have helped to clarify respective roles and
authority, in particular the 1996 Ordinance on the Specific Tasks and Powers of the
People’s Councils and People’s Committees at each level, there are continuing
coordination problems between central and local government, both due to unclear laws
and a continuation of the tradition of local autonomy discussed earlier. Many central
government decisions were not elaborated as guidelines by local governments, and thus
could not be implemented. Local governments issued regulations contradicting those of
central government. Local governments launched and expanded SOEs, managed natural
resources and undertook imports and exports often contrary to central policy. Both the
National Assembly and local authority have overlapping roles in deciding on revenue
collection and expenditure and on personnel issues. The latter has been clarified
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somewhat in a 2001 revised law that delegates more powers to localities in areas of
budget and organization of personnel. Yet the unclear demarcation of the mandates of
various agencies continues to leave room for discretion in interpretation of
responsibility and accountability where there are overlapping functions and duties
(ADB 2002).
Take for example the area of investment approvals. The difficult transitions discussed
above (party to state, rule by decrees to rule by law and others) create an unclear
authority situation that is filled by many state organizations, including local ones. In
such an environment the ability to make key decisions becomes crucial. In the case of
foreign investment the initial approval needed comes from the central government, but
the bulk of approvals come from local governments, which continue to control their
respective local economies.
Political and administrative practice may also be more decentralized in some provinces
than suggested by the formal lines of command. As in all political systems autonomy at
the local level depends to an extent on the standing and authority of local leaders.
Moreover although civil servants are ‘vertically’ responsible to central government
ministries, they are ‘horizontally’ responsible to the local authorities, with whom they
are in daily contact.
It should be emphasized that although many aspects of administration were taking place
at the local level, this did not necessarily mean a reduction of power by the party. A
small number of party members continued to wield great power on all big issues, at all
levels of government, and they were only loosely accountable through internal controls.
Still there were signs of increased rule by law, separation of administrative functions in
some areas, clearer legal documents and a growing consensus that consistency in policy
constitutes good practice. Although dedicated reformers push for this to be expanded,
there is and will continue to be resistance, since it goes against the fundamental tenet of
‘democratic centralism’ which vests supreme, unquestionable leadership in the party.9
Furthermore some provincial authorities are unenthusiastic about greater autonomy,
seeing it to their disadvantage where they lack the capacity required to undertake
development tasks. With the increasing reliance being placed on aid, the leadership of
some localities also supports the need for central supply of counterpart funds (McCarty
2002).
Yen Bai province shows the results possible from local government reforms. Following
the merger of three ministries to form the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural
Development in 1995, the Yen Bai People’s Committee authorized a corresponding
merger of the three corresponding provincial departments, leading to a reduction in staff
from 85 to 61, and of administrative units from 16 to 10. The new department defined
the roles of various bodies, including how the party worked with the department, the
department with professional agencies and enterprises, and the department with
people’s committees and party committees at the provincial and district levels. It then
re-examined these roles on a regular basis and made necessary adjustments. The
provincial department took on more activities, including designing comprehensive plans
on settlement, new economic zones, infrastructure construction, expansion of plantation
sector, environmental protection and training. Total agricultural production increased in
the province by 15 per cent over 1995–2000. There were also reforms carried out on
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other aspects of public administration in Yen Bai, including procedural reform and
reduction in organizational units to reduce overlap.
In another example Tuyen Quang province determined that it had too many old cadres
and too few young ones. To address these issues in 2000, the province started reducing
employees. It took 5 per cent of the province’s saving fund for a ‘fund for employment
resolutions’. This fund compensated early retirees; others were reassigned. From mid-
September 2000 to mid-January 2001, 85 of 587 staff members were retired.
Ho Chi Minh City has been a leader in subnational reforms in many areas, for example,
taking on the one-stop-shop system in three districts in 1995 to streamline business
regulations. Widened to five administrative offices the next year, it is now available on
an interactive website. The city also standardized forms across the different departments
that investors need to deal with (Thaveeporn 2002: 47-51 and Cohen 2001). These
reforms are perhaps the most full-blown example in Viet Nam of the process discussed
above where local authorities are pushed by market-driven forces to increase their role
in investment promotion and related areas, to facilitate links with production networks
in other countries.
Looking at the patterns of reform, including overlapping functions, double
subordination, ambiguous decrees and apparent lack of coordination, one may wonder
why an authoritarian state has been so slow to move toward greater administrative
coherence and control. The overarching reason is the importance of the organizational
network of party elites and supporters cutting across all formal administrative levels. As
in such networks in other places (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001: 6-10), the key to success
is not administrative prowess, but shaping the flow of communications that can keep
people connected, create bridges across different networks and create the perception that
the Party has a winning momentum, and that time is on its side. As part of this
communication pattern, decrees are only meant to be signals, calling for details to be
filled in by party insiders. This helps to maintain the status of party elites and the
importance of their personalistic ties, based on the power that comes from privileged
access to secret deliberations. Because there is only internal accountability in this power
network, there is no guarantee that the theoretical benefits of decentralization outlined
above will be realized through such a system.
A second part of the network pattern is that ambiguities help to smooth over conflicting
views among party elites, and to preserve an aura of unity.10 Such a network
organizational strategy is well suited for a highly diverse country such as Viet Nam,
with diversity exacerbated by the allegiances and legacies of 30 years civil war and the
very differently distributed benefits post-1986. The organizational network form
responds to this diversity by a constantly shifting push and pull in center-local relations
- that is, powers being granted, then being undermined by provincial committees, this
then countermanded by Hanoi's edicts and then round again. The network form is also
well suited for the fact that there is far less than certain knowledge about how to
produce desired changes. The organizational network offers an explicitly experimental
approach to policy, drawing on the different ideas of government units and levels in the
network, without being overly concerned with administrative coordination and
coherence.11 Since this organizational network structure seems to be central feature of
governance in Viet Nam, one can expect that the leadership will be cautious in carrying
out reforms in this area.
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A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF DECENTRALIZATION IMPACTS DURING
THE PERIOD
This section will begin to explore how decentralization supports the policy
commitments made by the government of Viet Nam to increase citizen participation,
accountability and reduction of poverty and regional disparities. It is not possible to
fully attribute policy outcomes to decentralization, but at least one can show a sequence
of decentralization followed by outcomes, and infer that the decentralization may have
had a role. The following will discuss three such outcomes: increased citizen
participation, poverty reduction and increased accountability.
Increased citizen participation
Take, for example, the policy commitment of citizen participation. The grassroots
democracy decree (GDD)12 asks local assemblies to consult residents about decisions.
The genesis goes back to the May 1997 peasant protests in Thai Binh province, and the
November 1997 protests in Dong Nai province. Thai Binh peasants protested against
corrupt local officials, punitive tax demands, land disputes, unfair rice price and
compulsory labor contributions; Dong Nai peasants protested against the appropriation
of church land by corrupt local authorities (Human Rights Watch 1997). Many of the
protesters were veterans of the American war. The government’s response was to
discipline some of the officials involved, and to adopt the GDD, which called for
greater transparency, participation and administrative streamlining. Between 1998 and
2001 a number of additional documents were issued to implement grassroots democracy
by the government, the Prime Minister and the GCOP.13
To implement the GDD, Prime Minister’s Directive no. 22/1998 suggested that one or
two places be chosen as experimental sites. One successful case reported is in the
village of Phu Long where, for example, officials asked villagers where they should
build a new electricity pylon and followed their advice. Some believe the reason this
case has succeeded is because of the presence of a foreign NGO (Thaveeporn 2002: 44–
45).
Another example of increased participation is community-driven environmental
regulation. O’Rourke (2001) reports that community pressure reduces pollution and
other hazards when the community groups are tightly bonded and well connected to
both local and national government, when state agencies can act autonomously, and
when firms must respond to external pressures and are in a strong market position.
Media pressure and favorable environmental laws also help to overcome problems of
double subordination and unclear accountability in enforcing environmental regulations
and laws.
Reduction of poverty and regional disparities
As another example linking decentralization and policy, take the policy commitment to
poverty reduction. Poverty dropped significantly between 1993 and 1998. The
proportion of the population below the total poverty line dropped from 58.1 per cent in
1993 to 37.4 per cent in 1998. The proportion below the food poverty declined from 25
per cent to 15 per cent. However, the gains in poverty reduction are fragile, since many
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people who were just below the poverty line in 1993 had just barely crossed above the
poverty line by 1998. These near poor could fall back below the poverty line with any
downturn. Although poverty has gone down in both rural and urban areas, the incidence
of rural poverty (45 per cent) is much higher than urban poverty (15 per cent). Further,
the extent of poverty, as measured by the poverty gap index, is much worse in rural
areas than in urban areas, and over 90 per cent of Viet Nam’s poor live in rural areas.
The rural poor are also more vulnerable to shocks caused by natural disasters or ill
health. Poverty reduction has occurred in all seven regions of Viet Nam but at different
rates. The regions with the worst poverty are the northern uplands (59 per cent), central
highlands (52 per cent) and north central coast (48 per cent). The southeast and the Red
River delta have proportionately the fewest poor. Inequality has gone up a bit in Viet
Nam 1993 and 1998, due to differing growth rates across rural and urban areas (ADB
2001).
What has been the role of decentralization in poverty reduction? One needs to start with
the view of most analysts that poverty reduction in the period was largely due to strong
economic growth, and the growth was mainly due to the rapid deepening of market
mechanisms.14 Analysts of Viet Nam’s policy reforms since 1986 (Fforde and de Vylder
1996; McCarty 2001) find a number of reasons for the rapid, largely successful
transition from a planned to a market economy, including the timing and gradualist
approach of policy reforms, the fact that central planning had only been partially
implemented, the maintenance of political stability, the ability to benefit from being
located in a rapidly growing region, and the credibility and advantages of citizens
perceiving the reforms as being of domestic origin.
Decentralization through organizational networks had a role in this. For example as
liberalization increasingly took hold, the wartime practices of local autonomy helped
support local initiatives even when they went against unwise, central decrees.
Smuggling of sugar, for example, helped to counteract protective measures intended to
shore up an uncompetitive, state owned sugar industry.
Another interesting case is the rapid development of coffee production in the central
highlands region. The government encouraged, starting in the early 1990s, people from
Mekong delta in the south and the Red River delta in the north to move to the central
highlands. The reason was partly to relieve population pressure in the deltas, but also
effectively to colonize the highlands. Coffee growing became one of the migrants’ main
sources of income. Viet Nam was able to become the world's second largest coffee
producer by achieving an exceptionally low cost structure. This seems to have come
from the way in which output gains were financed. For example, sales of land to
immigrants by those in-place (including existing SOEs), pushed resources into the
region. Because the windfall proceeds from land sales could largely finance the shift
from swidden and forest to intensive coffee production, the net cost of coffee production
to regional producers appeared low. However, as local accounting returns to a more
normal situation, net costs of production are likely to rise.15 How important was the role
of local authorities to Viet Nam’s coffee success? No doubt they gave extensive support
to land transfers, provision of inputs, and farm-to-market-roads and other infrastructure.
There is also anecdotal evidence that local political elites used immigrants to help
neutralize troublesome indigenous minorities, and yet there is also evidence that major
sales of land were made to majority Kinh on highly unfavorable terms. Another aspect
is that local authorities seem to have allowed a rundown of local ecological capital in
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the interest of breakneck production increases. Becoming a major world coffee producer
required coordination of many government bodies at the national, provincial and local
levels.
Aside from the role of decentralized institutions in promoting pro-poor economic
growth, what was the role of redistribution? Poverty is linked with subsistence farming,
and little access to schooling and health care. Ethnic minorities suffer from geographical
problems and special household characteristics (Sikor 2001). Improving education,
health and other public services could help to alleviate these characteristics. Yet as
mentioned above, during the period 1993-1998, significant poverty reduction took place
despite a decline in redistribution. There are many reasons for the decline, but the main
one is that so much of the growth was in the southeast and Red River delta. Some
redistribution took place through public spending, promoting immigration and other
factors, but redistribution could not keep up with economic growth rates over 8 per cent
during the period. Vietnamese administrative practices also work against effective
redistribution, including standardized budget norms and staffing ratios, incentives to
give misleadingly favorable reports and the difficult task of verifying such reports at
higher levels (Ascher and Rondinelli 1999:138). The government is now working to
improve redistributive mechanisms to address this problem, but the challenges are
major.
To further understand the role of decentralized institutions in poverty reduction, an
analysis of the provision of public services is instructive. One sector with clear
successes is health. Commune health centers are set up across the country, with service
and utilization rates equal or better than other countries in the region (World Bank, op.
cit., 44-54). The commune-level health system works better since the government
started paying staff salaries in the early 1990s (Tipping and Truong 1997).
Among the success factors are (1) shifting discretion from the ‘public’ to ‘private’ realm
within the organizational network; and (2) increasing administrative/fiscal/political
delegation to local government administrative organizations,16 although there are
significant interregional disparities. In this sense decentralization of health service
delivery has helped produce Viet Nam's impressive health outcomes in reducing infant
mortality and morbidity.
The focus on curative spending in hospitals benefits the better off; a greater focus on
preventative care would benefit more citizens, including the poor. Furthermore because
of the limitations of local revenue and voluntary contributions used in financing health
care at the commune level, there is a need to focus on primary health care, and to ensure
that all citizens benefit, including the poor (Tipping and Truong, op. cit.).
Another service mainly provided by local government is education, and many indicators
are favorable. Enrollment is up, particularly for girls. There are fewer dropouts and
repeaters, and more public financing for primary schools that benefit the poor. As in
other Asian countries, it is not clear whether improvements are due to decentralization,
or to other factors (Behrman et al. 2003: 94–95). However sample studies carried out in
recent years show that standards outside major cities like Hanoi are low, pointing to the
need for additional reform (World Bank, op. cit., 54–64).
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Improved accountability
Finally citizens and investors constantly complain about corruption, and many
complaints focus on local government. There is suspicion of corruption in large
construction projects, such as the Water Park in Hanoi, antipoverty programs in
minority areas, the cleaning up of polluted water in West Lake, Hanoi, and construction
of buildings in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The major anticorruption protest in Thai
Binh complained of financial improprieties; in response, the central government
suspended many top officials (Thaveeporn, op. cit., 35–36). One assumes that
opportunities for corruption arise for many reasons, including weak coordination among
government bodies, unclear and overlapping roles and authority and weak capacity
among enforcement bodies (Maitland 2001). Yet corruption also presumably plays a
key role in maintaining the allegiance of diverse elites and their supporters in
organizational networks. Thus the leadership has taken a cautious approach to
combating corruption, which is expected to continue.
REMAINING CHALLENGES
Viet Nam has come a long way in clarifying responsibilities between party and state,
and among different levels of government. And there is some evidence that the
remaining ambiguity of roles and responsibilities gives scope for useful policy
experimentation. The reforms have unfolded opportunistically, in fits and starts, not as
part of a structured reform program. Yet many of the features of Vietnamese reforms
also show up in developed country reform patterns, including marginal adjustments
rather than sudden changes, process based rather than structure based approaches, and
reforms that cycle back and forth: for example, decentralization replacing centralization,
followed by elements of re-centralization (cf. Jones and Kettle, 2003). The adjustments,
process reform, and cycling back are all intended to make policy making, public
financial management and service delivery more effective.
In September 2001 the government somewhat shifted gears, and formally adopted a
public administration reform master program that contains a comprehensive vision for
reforming the public administration system of Viet Nam. The program outlines a
workplan for the period 2001-2010, and it proposes to reform the entire public
administration system by the end of that period. This is in line with Viet Nam’s
overriding goal to accelerate the transition from a centrally planned to a socialist
oriented market economy, with a state governed by the rule of law.
The agenda for reform and renovation under the program is broad. It includes replacing
cumbersome administrative procedures with more simplified and transparent ones;
reducing red tape and corruption; better defining the mandates and functions of
institutions; reducing, during the period up to 2010, the number of ministries and
consolidating within these the number of agencies; reforming provincial and other
subnational administrations and redefining their relations with one another and the
center; streamlining and rightsizing the organizational structures of ministries and other
government agencies; reforming and rationalizing the relationship between ministries
and other administrative bodies, and service delivery organizations and enterprises;
raising the quality, standards and skills of civil servants and other public sector workers;
undertaking salary reform for public employees; reforming public financial
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management; and modernizing the public administrative system, notably through
computerization and the introduction of e-government.
Successful implementation of the program would address many of the constraints to
effective decentralization discussed above, including unclear mandates, weak
redistributive mechanisms, uneven service quality and limited citizen participation. By
2005 new regulations, working rules and methods are planned to be implemented that
more clearly define functions, tasks, authorities and responsibilities of local
administration, and distinguishing between urban and rural administrations. People’s
committees will also be restructured at each level by the same date (ADB 2003a).
Preliminary results at the sub-national level are mixed. A sample survey of citizens and
officials in 20 districts and 40 communes (ADB 2003b) reveals that a major result has
been simplification of administrative procedures through “one-stop, one-door” models.
Citizen's benefit by spending less time waiting and travelling, and having better
information provided to them. Some commune officials have benefited from being
given civil servant status. At the district level, competency standards and expenditure
management has improved. However, progress has been uneven; more prosperous
jurisdictions have benefited more than poor ones, and poor and vulnerable groups,
ethnic minorities and women benefit less than other groups. For example, even though
more efficient local administrations can now deliver birth and land use right certificates,
and other documents faster than before, poor people still cannot afford the charge.
Will the larger reform program be effectively implemented, leading to a more coherent,
hierarchical form of sub national governance? As suggested already there are many
factors that can be expected to slow down reforms, including the political and tactical
advantages of the present organizational network set-up, the formal structure of Viet
Nam as a unitary state, the presence of a strong executive along with a relatively weak
legislature, judiciary and civil society, a mistrusting of lower levels of administration
and the centralizing tendency of official development assistance. Decentralization in its
organizational network form can be expected to continue to expand at provincial and
district levels, but will expand more slowly, if at all, at the communal level. Granting
any meaningful decision making role to citizen’s groups outside of the privileged,
network organization is not likely in the foreseeable future, except for a limited number
of GDD pilots and community driven regulatory efforts (Firtzen 2002).
Yet even within such limited reforms, service delivery challenges can be better
addressed in many ways. For example, the publicly funded health system could be
reoriented to reduce regional disparities in spending and access, rather than reinforcing
these disparities. This could be done by changing the transfer formula used to set
transfers to the provinces (World Bank, op. cit., 53–54).
Disparities in education could be reduced if norms used for allocating funds became
more flexible. More funding could be provided for students in sparsely populated areas,
thus ensuring basic services. Poor provinces should get a larger share of capital budgets,
and with special allocations to attract and retain new students. More redistributive
funding would permit more and better targeted waiving of fees at the local level (World
Bank, op. cit., 64).
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Another round of Thai Binh-Dong Nai disturbances, perhaps motivated by a sharp
economic downturn, could spur broader participation than at present. In such a case the
grassroots democracy decree might be expanded to adapt local governance to the needs
of minority ethnic groups. For example the present administrative structure is based on
that of the Kinh majority and different from traditional authority structures in minority
groups. Local administrative structures could be encouraged to become more closely
aligned with traditional structures. The recruitment of minority officials could also be
more encouraged. Although minority officials are well represented at the commune
levels, the balance becomes uneven at higher levels. For example 11 per cent of the Cao
Bang population, but only 3 per cent of officials, are Dao. 29 per cent of the people of
Lao Cai province is Hmong, but only 13 per cent of provincial officials. In Van (Ha
Giang) 90 per cent of the population are Hmong, but only 21 per cent of officials. On
the other hand in Gac Ha district (Lao Cai), 11.5 per cent of the population are Kinh,
but 72 per cent of officials (Thaveeporn, op. cit.).
CONCLUSIONS
This article has explored the extent to which decentralization has supported the policy
commitments made by the government to increase citizen participation and
accountability, and ensure that public service delivery helps to reduce poverty and
regional disparities. A review of basic definitions of decentralization sets some
preliminary limits on the case study and places it in an international context. A brief
discussion ensues on the historical context in Viet Nam and its relevance, followed by
an analysis of decentralization policy intention vs implementation reality. There is a
preliminary analysis of the impact of decentralization during the period, and finally
some remaining challenges. The article examines the interplay between hierarchical and
network organizations in Viet Nam, as stakeholders seek to better define the respective
roles and authority of the party, and other public, quasi-public and private organizations
at different territorial levels. These patterns have played out against a backdrop of rapid
economic growth, generating a rush of lucrative opportunities for well placed
entrepreneurs within or closely linked to the party network. A related element is that, as
in other parts of Asia, local authorities are increasing their role in investment promotion
and the streamlining of business regulation, to facilitate market-driven links across
borders and with production networks in other countries.
The results have been mixed. On the one hand policy statements, decrees and new laws
have clarified and codified functional responsibilities across different levels of party and
government. On the other hand a small number of party members continue to wield
great power on all big issues, at all levels of government, and only loosely accountable
through internal controls. These two seemingly contradictory strands of rule of law and
democratic centralism are in a sense woven together by an organizational network. The
network acts in many ways with considerable discretion (particularly to enhance the
self-interest of network members), but under the ideological leadership of party elites.
Against this landscape one can expect decentralization reforms leading to greater
administrative coherence and consistency will continue to move ahead at a slow pace.
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NOTES
1 The author is grateful for comments received on an earlier draft from Eduardo Gomez,
Brown University, Prof. Scott Firtzen, National University of Singapore, Doug Porter,
ADB, and two anonymous peer reviewers. This article is based on Wescott, C.
“Decentralization Policy and Practice in Viet Nam: 1991-2003”, in Paul Smoke and
Edwardo Gomez, eds. Decentralization in Comparative Perspective, in press from
Edward Elgar Press, Northampton, Mass. The views expressed in this article are the
author’s own, and do not necessarily represent those of ADB.
2 Portions of this and the next section summarized from Wescott, C. and D. Porter (in
press).
3 This categorization as defined by Rondinelli et al. (1983: 13–31), Leonard and
Marshall (1982: 27–37), and others, is the most widely accepted in the recent literature,
although Cohen and Peterson (1999: 52–61) list a long array of alternative definitions.
4 Portions of this section summarized from Wescott (2001).
5 Personal communication from Prof. Scott Fritzen, National University of Singapore,
December 2002.
6 Personal communication from Doug Porter, ADB, August 2002.
7 The officially designated body for mobilizing the public to support party directives.
8 Since August 2002, the Ministry of Home Affairs.
9 Personal communication from Prof. Scott Firtzen, National University of Singapore,
December 2002.
10 Personal communication with Martin Painter, City University of Hong Kong,
December 2002.
11 Such a strategy may have been unplanned. See Peters, B. Guy (2002). For elaboration
of this argument as applied to Viet Nam, see Fforde and de Vylder (1996).
12 Directive no. 30-CT/TW of 18 February 1998.
13 For example, ‘Government Decree no. 29-1998-ND/CP of 11 May 1998 on the
promulgation of regulations to implement grassroots democracy at the commune level;
Prime Minister Directive no. 22/1998.CT-TTg of 15 May 1998 on the implementation
of grassroots democracy at the commune level; Prime Minister Directive no.
24/1998/CT-TTg of 19 June 1998 on the building and implementation of customary
laws of villages; Circular no. 03/1998/TT-TCCP of 6 July 1998 of the Government
Committee on Organization and Personnel guiding the implementation of grassroots
democracy in communes, wards, and district towns; Plan no. 145-TT/TCCP of 6 July
1998 of the Government Committee on Organization and Personnel on the
implementation of grassroots democracy in communes, wars, and district towns; and
Government Decree no. 71/1998ND-CP of 8 September 1998 on the promulgation of
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the regulations to realize grassroots democracy in government agencies’; Thaveeporn
(2002: 44).
14 The 20.8 per cent decline in poverty between 1993 and 1998 can be broken down into
a 30.7 per cent increase in the growth component and a 7.6 per cent decline in the
redistribution component.
15 Private communication with Adam Fforde, Aduki Ltd., Sydney, Australia.
16 Although 43 per cent of government expenditure takes place in provinces, districts
and communes which is higher than the average for the region, this rises to 63 per cent
for health, and 73 per cent for education, based on 1998 figures; the total is up from 26
per cent in 1992 (World Bank, op. cit. 20). Bird et al 1998 has a higher estimate of
subnational expenditure proportion for 1992 (35 per cent, excluding commune
expenditures), showing the difficulty of making such estimates using Viet Nam data.
Data on six countries in the region for which comparable data are available can be
calculated using the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics yearbook as reported on
OECD-DAC Indicators page: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines and
Thailand.
http://www.bellanet.org/indicators/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_indicator&indicator_id=7
Bearing in mind the limitations in using such data (Ebel and Yilmaz 2001), only China
and Mongolia have a subnational share of public expenditures over 30 per cent (China
is 54 per cent), while Malaysia and Indonesia are under 20 per cent, and Philippines and
Thailand under 10 per cent.
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